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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
GUST PAPADOPULOS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
l\IARIO DEF ABRIZIO,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal From _the Third District Court of Utah,
for Salt Lake County
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge

Appellant's Reply Brief
STATE~IENT

Respondent has objected to parts of appellant ·s
statement of facts, and he has made a statement of
his version of the facts of the case.

Appellant objects to respondent's statHment of
facts, and to his arguments thereon, and, therElf,ore, must request a compJete exa1nination of the
Pntire record.
:\ ppt:·llnnt

re~p~ctfully

.~ho"n..

that

re~~)ondent '~

brief contains fallacies and artifir.(~f. lt st1··ings
together some propositions that are indisputably
trn~, and covertly a'3Rumes that other~ mingl~d with
them, but not diRtinctly as~PrtPd. are also tr11e. lt
~ l~o n~e~ the artifice of truthfully ~t~ting a. series
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of faets, but suppresses one, or more, of the controlling ones.
Respondent has been misled by overlooking some
facts whieh completely nullify the validity of his
reasoning. He loses sight of important elements,
and gets only a .partial view of the things he is investigating and discussing. His facts are made to
fit a theory or a hypothesis by suppressing nlaterial indisputable facts, and by, advancing mere conclusions.
I

Respondent overlooks the stipulations and objections of counsel, and the rulings of the trial court,
and findings Nos. 4 . and 5, and appellant's brief,
page 27, quoted:
''During the trial it was stipulated by
eou.nse~, and then ruled by the trial judge,
that said t'vo tenants could not try the
titles of their landlords. The court said:
'l\1r. Gray and the County might litiga.te
that' - not the tenants. (B. E. 1()3; Tr.
161). That 'Yas the right ruling.''
So, the trial court did not try the titles, and did not
permit the tenants to try titles, and did not convert an alleged trespass case between tenants into
an action under R. S. U. 1933, gQ-10-35. And respondent did not prove any ta~ sale, and he did not
offer any certificate of tax sale aH provided in
80-10-35~ R. S. U. 1933, or otherwise, or at all.
There is no legal evidence to support any ta,x title.
•A.ppellant stands on the record.
:The seven sections of freP hold lands described in
the pleadings and exhibits are held under patents
of the U. S. A.~ which granted these lands ''to have
and to hold with the appurtenaneer-; thereof unto
the claimant and the heirs and assigns of the claim·
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ant forever.'' This freehold can be taken fro1n the
patentee only by con.veyanc.e or descent. The tenure of lands does not depend upon the payment of
taxes. Tax rolls are not evidence of legal title. Salt
Lake County, 'vhich has released its tax liens, has
never had even the semblance of legal seizin of a
square foot of these lands. 'rhese lands have never
been sold to discharge ta.:x liens.
'rhe UtahSt1preme Court has stated that the treasurer's ''sale'' to the County is not a sale. The
'treasurer's certificate operates to fix the date fron1
which the tax lien bears interest. The legal situation is that the County had a legal lien and th.at the
legal seizin oontinues to follow the record title.
·The auditor's deed to the County at the maturity of
the lien is not predicated on an unredee1ned ''sale''
and can therefore not operate as a conveyance of
th£l freehold. The effect of the auditor's deed is
to give to th€' County the power to sell its· tax lien
at public May sale or at ~uhseqnent private sale,
or a.lternativelv to sne to have the freehold subiected to judicial sale a'R 13pecifically prescribed by
the statutes.
Here we have two tenants, commonly called Pappas
and Defa, under written leases frorrJ the eommon
landlords, L. H. Gray and Western Land Association, "rho had the legal seizin and record title, on
"~far~inal

land, on the fringe of the wheat
land, and on the fringe of grazing· land
which C€nters around the "rater hole on
Rertion 31 - both tenant~ in poRRessi on.''
shepherd grazing his sheep, and Defa a
fnrmer with an

Pnppa.R

fl

''Idea that he could extend the wheat belt
""'est into the hills, and with this in n1ind
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.made a lease _with Gray 0\11 'April 6, 193b.
When _.Pappas learned from Def_a that. Gray
no. longer owned Section 31, Paprpas immediately went to Salt Lake Uounty to
secure a lease. Salt Lake County ._gave
1->.appa.s a lease on 1\'lay 4, 1938, (and an
option to purchase) on contig-uous sections,
excluding Section 31. _Pappas acknowledged his. landlord _Gray had no title to
Section 31, and recognized Defa 's lease .with
Salt Lake County for Section 31, and did
in·no way interfere with D·efa's harvesting
his crop under his lease with Salt Lake
County for 1938. The harvest 'vaS' not completed until 1939. In reliance upon Gray's
title which Defa had repudiated, Defa began to plow and plant Section 31 in 1940.
It is the trespass of plowing up the fe,ed for
Pappas's: flock with the loss of grazing and
damage to his sheep (after May 20, 1940)
of which the respondent complains.''
See respondent's brief, pp. 3 and 4, for the a.bove
quotations. lJpon the foregoing statement Pappas
claims the right to trespass and feed the crop of
wheat planted by Defa.
And upon the foreg1oing statement of facts respondent no'v claims $250 for ''loss of lambs'-' betwe-en May 20th and June 7th, 1940. He quotes
part of P'ara~graph 8 of the complaint (Resp. B-rief,
page 17) and· suppresses the other· parts. The full
par_agraph reads :
''On or about April 25, 1940, plaintiff drove
his 2000 hea.d of sheep on said property for
the purpo·se of grazing, shearing and lambing said sheep, and plaintiff kept said
sheep on said prop·erty until on or about
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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J nne 7, 1940,

..

., .

\\~hen

plaintiff left \Yith onehalf of said sheep and their lambs, the remainder of the she~ep being kept on said
property until on or about June 15, 1940,
\Yhen plaintiff took them a\ray."
That is the only place in the complaint where respondent mentioned ''lambs,'' and there he shows
that "plaintiff left (the p·roperty) with the lambs
on or about June 7, 1940." He does. not .allege the
loss of any lambs at any time - and he did not lose
any lambs. He sold said lambs the following Se~
tember for $4.85 as shown by his 10wn testimony in
this case. ...~nd he \Yas in possession of said Section 31 and the water springs thereon from April
25th to June 15th, 1940, as shov\7Jl by his own
pleauing and tes thnony in this case.
All sheepmen know that \vith seven sections of
grazing land, and 'vith but "one watering place,"
it is necessary for ewes to le~ave their lambs some
eonsiderable distance in order to ohtain water, and
that it is physically impossib~e to prevent ewes
from losing their lambs. I__jaml1inga took place in
April, and the trial court found: '' Tha.t on or aboui
M~ay 20, 1940 to and including June 1, 1940, defendant plowed a portion of the above described
property'' after the lan1 bing season, ''thereby causing the loss of approximately fifty lambs'' but does
~ot find thP 1'alue of said lam/bs. There is no finding of fact to sustain said all e2:ed damages.
Let's stop, look and listen. I .Jet's studv said paragraph 8 of the complaint just quoted. This is the
gist of the pleading. This is the alleg-efl nossession
Rnd rig-ht of possession upon which this a.ction for
alleged trespass is prPdicated. This kind of posRPssion \viii not support any action for alleg·ed tresSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~pass.

The complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause 10f action for alleg1ed trespass
and injunction. The trial court erred in overruling
the demurrer to the, complaint. The respondent
p~ea.d himself out of c;ourt. A.nd by his statement
he admits himself out of court. There .is no pleading to support finding· No. 10 as to any damages
'vhatever. Appellant objected· every time, and in
ievery way, the law gave him the opportunity to do
so. See appellant's brief.

Note the possession plead and quoted. l'appas
ar,gues he was not in possession in l:J38; and that he
herded his sheep off in 1939; and that he did not
molest D~efa 's possession in 1938 and 1939. But
that on April 25, 1940, he dro;ve his sheep onto S'aid
prloperty, and that he kept said sheep on said property until June 15, 1940, when he took them away
and surrendered the alleged possession to Defa __.
and, of course, to his landlord, L. H. Gray. vvl1en
he ·commenced this action in January., 1941, he had
been out of possession about six months or more.
He ple:ads, admits and argues that Defa "ras in pos. sessiton in 193H, 1939 and 1940 and farming said
lands under his said leas-e of April 6, 193R nnller the
common landlord, L. H. Gray. and that h~ herded
off his sheep as therein providen.
The crux of this case is: ''A crop believed to be
.grain which crop is now .growing upon ~aid property 'vhich crop renders the land useful for the purposes of grazing'' as alleged in parag1raph 9-c of
nlaintiff's verified complaint. That shows the
.~otives of, the plaintiff in commencing this action,
and the afterthoug~t ~hout d4o:rpa.ge~ which he did
not a1le~e and the frnd1n~s do.l\su~ta1n, and the law
do-es not support. He is precluded and estopped
by his acts.
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Appellant asserts that the follo,ving· are

INDISPUTABL:BJ F,ACTS

1.
On March 15, 1935, L. H. Gray and \\"r estern Land
.A.ssociation were the owners, and in the sole possession of the Barney (ianyon Ranch, containing
approximately seven sections of land shown in Ex.
hibit No. 2 - a photostatic copy of the ID;a.p an .
nexed to the lease. On that day they leased and let
said lands to Gust Pappas, this respondent, for a
term of five years ending December 31, 1939, for
grazing of sheep, and under this lease the respondent went into possession of said lands, and paid
rents to said landlords for the years 1936, 1936 and
1937, and retained possession of said lands under
said lease until December 31, 1939, as shown by the
records and files in the transcript _·a,nd bill of exceptions. ,A copy of said lease is annexed to the
complaint, but for some reason, perhaps Sec.
104-2-14, it was suppressed hy respondent.

The following is the copy annexed to the, complaint:

EXHIBIT A
This ag,reement of lease is entered into at
Salt Lake City, Utah. the 15th . _day:; of
l\farch, 1935, by and bet-\v-een L. H. Gray,
agent lesRor and Gust Pappas lessee. 'VIT . .

NESSETH:
The leased prrmises is tl1e Barney Canyon
Ranch in Salt Lake County, State of lTtah,
containing approximately seven sectionR of
lancl, a n1a.p of 'vhich i ~ attached. The
leaRe iR for a. period of FIVE years unless sooner terminated by a ~ale of the
r>roperty, anrl is for thc> g-razing; of sheep,
lnmhinp: and Rhf\arin.!!·. Should a sa1r he
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n1ade at lambing and shearing time such
sale is. nort to interfere with lambing and
shea.ring for that year.
T4is lease hegins January 1, 1935 and ends
on December 31, 1939. The lease price is
$400.00 for the year 1935 and $500.00 each
year thereafter, payabJ.e one-half at shearing time and the other half at sale of lambs
in the fall. This includes all my ranch
above the track of B. & G. Ry.
Failing to n1ake said payment~, the lease
stands terminated 'vithout further notice.

L. H. GRAY (signed).
G·UST PAPPAA (signed).
On Ap~ril 6, 1938' said L. H. Gray and Western
Land Associ.ation leased and let to appellant,
Marion Defa, for a term of six years, ending April
6, 1944,. approximately 300 acres of said land, und~r
a written crop lease, a copy of which lease was plead
at length in the ans,ver and counterclaim, and received in evidence as Exhibit 3, and quoted on pages
18, 19 and 20 of appellant's hrief. No reply to this
answer ~and counterclaim was filed. This lease
provides:
''This lease is not to interfere with the
grazin~ lease to Gust Pappas for the spring
of 1938. After thRt Rnita.ble arrangement
isi to be made with Pappas to herd his she·ep
off of the grain or \Vheat."
That accounts for the more than remarkable statement in respondent's brief at pp. 9 and 27:
''Respondent took possession of Section
31 in the spring of 1939 and protected appelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lant '~ cr.op by hiring t\vo extra sheep herders
·~ J, 75). ''
'·'!'he evidence esta.bli -shes th.a.t respondent
~, .. was. in possession in 193'9, placed extra
men to protect the wheat, and pern1itted
appellant to harvest his. crop without
molestation (Tr. 73, 75, 112, 11B, 115, 158). ';
. Of cour~e,. appellant ·and respondent were both in
possession in 1939, as provjded in said leases, and
as provided by Sec. 104-60-4, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933. That is indisputably true; and it is
also indisputably true that both tenants were in
possession on May 4, 1938; and that said landlords.,
L. H. Gray and Western I ..land Association, \vere,
and now are, in possession, and they are the owners of said lands ; and that said landlords O\Vn an
undivided one-flourth of the crops of \Yhea.t gro,vn
on said land; and that they directed the clearing,
p}o,ving and planting thereof by this appellant,
Defa; and that the respondent purposely suppressed said facts when he prepared Finding of
Pact No. 4. That is prejudicjal and reversible
error.
3.
At all times mentioned said landlords. L. H. Gray
and Western Land Association, were in possession
of all of said lands under said two tenants and nnder said two written leases. ~The said landlords
had, and n1ow have, legal rights to the rtntals pro\?ided in both of said leases. Neither of s.ai.d ten.:
ants can legally question the possession, nor right
of possession, :of s:aid landlords. The said landJords are protected by, and both of said tenHnt~ ai·e
subject to and barred by, the provi.Rions of
104-2-14, Rev. Stat. of Utah, 1933,
""l1irh reRdR ~
"104-2-14. - Possession of Tenant De·etnPrl Possession of Ijandl'Ord. - "W11en the rP-

crl..
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lation of landlord and tenant has existed
bet\veen any persons, the posses8ion of the
tenant is deemed the po·ssession of the landlord until the expiration of seven years
t rom the termination of the tenancy, or,
where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years from the
tin1e of the last payment of rent, .notwithstanding that such tenant may have ac.
quired another title, or may have claimed ·
to hold adversely to his landlord; but such
presumption eannot he made after the
periods herein limited.''

In the case of
Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 Utah, at Page 222,
this Court said :
''So long as- the tenant remains in possession, his possession is that of the landlord,
and he cannot by words or acts, make hiR
possession, or that of one whom he pernlits upon the premises, a possession adverse to the landlord.''
That is the law of this State. That is the general
rule and it is supported by the weight of autho·rity
and sound legal reasoning. _
''The doctrine is not merely technical ·but
is founded in public convenience and policy,
because it tends to encourag~e honesty and
2'0od faith between landlord and tenant,
~nd is, undoubtedly, well root~d in sound
morality."
· 16 Ruling Case La.w, Par 137, Page 650.
4.

Neither the respondent nor the appellant secured
any leg1al lease from Salt Lake County. Both
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agreements of May 4, 1938, Exhibits No. 1 and H,
recite:

Salt Lake County ''hereby appoints the
Second Party as agent for the l11rst Party
for the sole and only p'ttrpose of guarding, protecting and preserving the above
described property fro 1n the 4th day oI
1llay, A. D. 1938.''
This in legal effect appointed L. H. Gray, the landlord and legal S'eizin owner and holder of the record
title, because the said tenants were then in possession under said L. H. Gray. Neither of the tenants
paid anything to Salt Lake County for said agreements, which are not leases 'ttnder the la1vs.

5.
Said agreement of }lay 4th, 1938, Exhibit H, provided:

"Second Party (Gust Pappas) is hereby
granted au option to p'tt'rchase said property on tenns acceptable to First Party.''

'

.And that accounts for the alle,g1a.tion that '' Pa,p·pas
immediately went to Salt Lake County'' to avoid
payment of $500 rent for 1938 to L. H. Gray, and to
purchase the tax lien and get a tax title on ~fay 4,
1938, at the ~fay s·ale. This is shown by Exhibit Kl
Bill of Exceptions, page 172.
''The broad view is taken that a tenant cannot become directly or indirectly a purchaser at a tax s.ale and thereby acquire any
title "Thich he may assert agninst his landlord. The remedy of the tenant is rather
to discharge the assessment himself and
deduct the amount fDom the rent. If the
tenant was at the time indebted to the landlord for rent in the amo1int of taxes,· he
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should p.a~ such taxes, and he is precluded
from purchasing or leasing for his sole
benefit.''
Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444; ~4 U. S.
· (L.· Ed.) 360..
Notes: 15 Am. Dec. 6,90; 89 ·A~ S .R. 84;
. 53 L. R. A. 940; 15 En~. Rul. Cas. 305.

6.
The appellant, Def~, secured the agreement of May
4, 1938, Exhibit No. 1, for .Section 31, because he
had half of· the said work done under said lease ·of
April 6, 1938 fr10m said landlord, L. H. Gray. (Tr.
64 to 68, and Appellant's Brief, p. 31). That agreement was to protect hiin~elf and his landlord, L. H.
Gray. And he completed the plowing and planting
according to the said lease of April 6, 1938, and at
all tirnes Defa has pHrforn1ed and kept his sB.id leilse
with L. H. Gra.y, and nort aaverse t~o him. ·All of
that testimony is in the hill of exceptions, and it has
he en abstracted in appellant's brief, and it has not
been denied, or explained otherwise. So it sta.nds
as anot.her indisputable fact

7.
There was no eviction of any one at any time.
Pappas had his camp and sheep on Section 31 on
May 4, 1938. He did not move off until June 15,
1938, and he us.ed parts of Section 31 every year
from 1935 to and including June 15, 1940, notwith .
standing his lease expired on December 31, 1939,
and notwithstanding the extended explanation .on
p-age 11 of respondent's hrirf. That is the on1y
watering place . on s·aid seven sections of land de;Scribed in said leases. A.nd, of course, it is unre.asonable to believe that Pappas did not water his
sheep and us·e said ·Section 31 in April, May and
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June of each year. All of the pleadings, exhibits,
and testilnony sustain that fact, and there is no dispute whatever. So that is another indisputable
fact.

B.
Finally, the legal relationship of landlord and tenant between Pappas and Gray did not te·rminate until l)ecember 31, 1939. The lease bet,veen Defa and
Gray does not terminate until April ti, 1944. The
original landlord, L. H. Gray, and the tenant, Defa,
,at all times after April 6, 1938 were and now are
in the possession, and Pappas \Ya.s a trespasser after
the expiration of his said lease 1on December 31,
1939.

CONCLUSION
By his own pleadings and admissions in the record,

the respondent has plead himself out of court. He
:is precluded and estopped, and in good conscie·nce
and equity, of right ou~ht to be precluded and
estopped from maintaining this action against
Defa. As a tenant of L. H. Gray, on l\fa.y 4, 1938,
respondent had $500 rentals in his possession and
was under le1glal duty to p·rotect the p·roperty and
the possession for his landlord, L. H. Gray. .And
.as an honest man, with clean hands in equity, he
should have gone to his landlord, ,and not to the
County, when he learned of the non-payment of
taxes, and provided the money to pay such delinquent taxes from said rentals. And when he saw
Defa plo,ving and planting wheat in 1938 to he har'"<'~ted in 19'39 he should have~ stopped him, or had
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his land1ord stop him, and not stand by and see
l)efa spend thousands of dollars clearing, plowing
and planting said lands in 1938, and by hiring herders to keep his sheep off the wheat crop in 1939!
Respondent is now in U. S. A., where, thank God,
there are still laws and equity and courts to enforce them. The judgment of the trial court denies
the appellant due process of law which is guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of this State.
The judgment ap·pealed from should be reversed
'vith eosts.
Respectfully submitted.

C. E. NORTON,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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